



Economic and Financial Report 2007/01 
 
 
A Primer on Public Investment in Europe, Old and New
† 
 





This Economic and Financial Report should not be reported as representing the views 
of the EIB. The views expressed in this EFR are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily represent those of the EIB or EIB policy. EFRs describe research in 





JEL Classification codes:   E62, H54, L33 
 
Notes 
† This paper will appear in a book based on a seminar on Strengthening Public Investment 
and Managing Fiscal Risks from PPPs, to be published by Palgrave Macmillan and the 
International Monetary Fund. 
 
* The authors are, respectively, Head and Senior Economist, Economic and Financial Studies 
Division of the European Investment Bank  
 
 
Individual copies of the Reports are available on-line from http://www.eib.org/efs/ 
 
 
   2
 







We take stock of what is known about public investment in the member states of the 
European Union, old and new alike. The interesting features about the long-term evolution of 
public investment have been its downtrend in old EU member states, bar the cohesion 
countries, and its volatility in new member states. The downtrend in the old member states 
cannot be traced back to EMU’s fiscal rules per se, nor can it be explained by the emergence 
of innovative financing mechanisms for infrastructure, such as public-private partnerships. 
Rather, it is the result of drawn-out episodes of fiscal adjustment and consolidation, 
necessitated by long periods of unsustainable fiscal policies and deterioration of 
governments’ net worth. We also examine the composition of public investment and 
conclude that only half of it comprises infrastructure investment in EU-15 and in EU-8, with 
a slightly higher share in the cohesion countries. The share of infrastructure investment, 
especially in traditional transport and other communications infrastructure, is in EU-8 
somewhat higher than in old EU member states, but below the level in the cohesion 
countries. All this suggests for the new member states that the on-going build-up of their 
public capital stocks, especially infrastructure capital, requires the safeguarding of sufficient 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Many aspects of public investment are surprisingly poorly understood, at least in the 
European context. To start with, there is often confusion about what public investment means 
in the first place, as much of economic literature employs the terms ’public investment’ and 
’infrastructure investment’ interchangeably. A great deal of public investment is not 
infrastructure investment, and a great deal of infrastructure investment is not public. As we 
will dwell on the composition of public investment in what is to come, some examples of 
non-public infrastructure investment should suffice here. They include investment by energy 
companies in generation capacity; telecoms companies in networks; or rail companies in 
rolling stock or rail track. In all these cases commercial enterprises finance these investments 
which are recorded as investment of the enterprise sector in national accounts statistics—
regardless of the ownership structure of the enterprises. Only investment directly financed 
from the budget of the government—at the central or subnational level—qualifies as public 
investment. 
 
Furthermore, public investment has attracted only limited academic interest as a research 
topic. While some empirical studies have sought to assess the productivity of public 
investment, issues such as the determinants or the composition of public investment have 
received much less attention. This omission is somewhat surprising, given that sufficient data 
exist to address these issues empirically and given that the issues are of obvious policy 
relevance.  
 
The aim of this paper is take stock of what we know about public investment in the member 
states of the European Union, old and new alike. We will start by depicting the long-term 
evolution of public investment in section 2. Section 3 will examine its determinants, with a 
special focus on EMU’s fiscal rules and innovative financing mechanisms for infrastructure, 
where the experience of old EU member states can be especially instructive for the new 
member states. The composition of public investment is discussed in section 4, and section 5 




   4
2.   Long-term trends in public investment  
 
Public investment has experienced a general downward trend—at least if measured in 
relation to GDP—in old EU member countries (EU-10 in Figure 1) during the past three 
decades. However, as explained below, that general downtrend hides significant differences 
between individual countries. Most notably, public investment has actually increased, again 
in relation to GDP, in the cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). There 
was also a slight increase in the new Eastern European member states (EU-8) at the outset of 
their transition in the early 1990s, with a subsequent levelling out. These broad trends are 
depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Gross fixed capital formation by the general government in EU countries (in 












Source: Eurostat, OECD. 
 
The evolution of public investment in the individual countries is examined in detail in 
Mehrotra and Välilä (2006),who show that in the group of large countries (France, Germany, 
Italy, and the UK) public investment halved from 4 percent of GDP in the early 1970s to 
some 2 percent of GDP in recent years. The fall has been particularly pronounced in 
Germany and in the UK, where public investment has fallen from a peak of about 5 percent   5
of GDP in the early 1970s to an average of 1.5 percent since the turn of the millennium. In 
contrast, the decline has been only about 0.5 percentage points of GDP in France. 
 
The fall in public investment has been pronounced also in the group of smaller non-cohesion 
countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden), where public 
investment has halved on average from about 5 to 2.5 percent of GDP. Austria and Belgium 
have experienced the biggest declines, from 5 percent of GDP in early 1970s to 1-2 percent 
of GDP in recent years. In contrast, Finland’s public investment has declined by only one 
percentage point of GDP during the past three decades.  
 
The cohesion countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) have been even less 
homogenous as a group; nevertheless, public investment has tended to trend up rather than 
down within that group. Ireland, representing an extreme, has seen public investment drop 
from the peak of 6 percent of GDP in the 1970s to below 2 percent of GDP in the late 1980s, 
with a subsequent bounce back to 4 percent of GDP more recently.  
 
Before turning to new EU member states, let us pause for a moment to consider how the 
evolution of public investment flows in old EU member states described above have affected 
their public capital stocks—arguably the more important variable in the long term.  
 
Estimates by Kamps (2006), Mehrotra and Välilä (2006) show that public capital stocks have 
roughly doubled since 1970 in all large EU countries except in the UK, where the cumulative 
growth has been below 40 percent and where the public capital stock has remained rather flat 
since the late 1970s. Among smaller non-cohesion countries public capital stocks have 
trebled in Belgium and Finland, doubled in Austria and Sweden, while growing more 
modestly in the Netherlands and Denmark. The growth took place as early as the 1970s in 
Austria, Belgium, and Denmark; since the 1980s, these countries’ public capital stocks have 
remained almost unchanged. As regards the cohesion countries, the public capital stock has 
grown almost fivefold in Portugal, fourfold in Spain, and more than doubled in Greece and 
Ireland. 
 
The important observation with respect to public capital stocks in old EU member countries 
is that they have grown steadily in real terms in all but a few countries. This implies that the 
downtrend in the ratio of public investment to GDP has not been so steep as to cause public   6
investment to fall below the level of depreciation;
1 on the contrary, in most old EU member 
countries public investment continues to cover depreciation and allow for a further expansion 
of public capital stocks. Granted, the downtrend in investment flows has led to a slowdown 
in the rate of growth of public capital stocks, but it has not reversed that growth. 
 
Turning then to the new EU member states in Eastern Europe, the interesting feature of their 
public investment in the past decade and a half is volatility, rather than trend behaviour. Few 
EU-8 countries have experienced steep up- or downtrends in their public investment relative 
to GDP, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. However, the volatility of their public investment-to-
GDP ratios varies. Figure 2 depicts the four EU-8 countries with the flattest ratios, while 
Figure 3 shows the four most volatile ones.
2 The countries with lower volatility have tended 
to have higher levels of public investment relative to GDP, often at or above the cohesion 
countries, and the countries with more volatility have had lower average levels of public 
investment relative to GDP, often well below the cohesion countries.















      
                                                       
1 Given the high degree of inertia of the capital stock, lower investment rates affect the evolution of the stock 
very slowly. Hence, we should not conclude that the low level of investment in some countries would be 
sufficient to maintain the level of capital stocks in the long run.  
2 Volatility is here measured by the coefficient of variation, which relates the standard deviation of variable to 
its mean value.   7





























                                                                                                                                                                    
3 A word a caution: data on public investment in EU-8 vary between different sources, in some cases 
significantly. While some of the details presented here may be specific to the data source used, the broader 
conclusions should be robust across data sources.     8
 
Of course, volatility in public investment-to-GDP ratios depends on the ups and downs of 
both public investment and GDP. While public investment and GDP tend to move in 
tandem,
4 public investment in EU-8 has by some measure been somewhat more volatile than 
GDP.
5 Moreover, a low level of public investment relative to GDP is more strongly 
associated with high volatility in public investment itself, rather in GDP.
6 In other words, 
higher volatility and lower level of public investment go hand in hand, so the pattern of 
volatility and level shown in Figures 2 and 3 can indeed be traced back to the behaviour of 
public investment itself, with GDP movements playing a relatively smaller role.  
 
How these public investment flows have affected the size of public capital stocks in EU-8 is 
difficult to say in the absence of data on public capital stocks for these countries. Measured 
by various physical quantity indicators, such as the density of road and rail networks, EU-8 
countries do not seem to be far behind old EU member states, if at all. However, such 
physical quantity indicators ignore the quality of infrastructure assets, which is in some cases 
poor or even substandard in EU-8. Therefore, to make the value of their public capital stocks 
converge to the levels observed in old EU member states, EU-8 countries would need to 
invest considerably more in flow terms. While it is, of course, difficult to say how significant 
the gap between EU-10 and EU-8 shown in Figure 1 is in this respect, we will return to this 
issue in Section 4 when examining the composition of public investment. 
 
3.   Determinants of public investment 
 
Having examined the evolution of public investment, it is opportune to ask what has 
accounted for it. The primary aim of this section is to identify long-term structural 
determinants of public investment, with factors behind cyclical swings of lesser interest. For 
that reason the focus is on old EU member states, including the cohesion countries. However, 
the analysis revolves around two issues with direct relevance for the new member states as 
well, namely the impact of EMU’s fiscal rules on public investment and the significance of 
                                                       
4 In the sample shown in Figures 2 and 3, the simple correlation coefficient between public investment and GDP 
is, on average, 0.85.    
5 The coefficient of variation in the sample of Figures 2 and 3 is on average 42 percent for public investment 
and 38 percent for GDP.  
6 The correlation between public investment relative to GDP and the coefficient of variation for public 
investment is -0.57, while the correlation between public investment relative to GDP and the coefficient of 
variation for GDP is -0.27.   9
innovative financing mechanisms for infrastructure, such as public-private partnerships 
(PPPs). Consequently, the experience of old EU member states, as detailed below, can offer 
useful lessons for EU-8.  
 
3.1  Have EMU’s fiscal rules suppressed public investment? 
7 
 
The trend decline in public investment in old EU member states has on occasions been linked 
to EMU’s fiscal rules, including the Maastricht convergence criteria pertaining to fiscal 
deficits and public debt as well as the deficit rule embodied in the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004)—concerned that public investment has already fallen 
to sub-optimally low levels in many EU countries—suggest that the SGP be rewritten so as 
to exclude public investment spending altogether from the measure of fiscal deficit that is 
subject to the rule. Underlying this suggestion is the argument that the SGP or any similar 
deficit rule is, by construction, bound to discriminate against public investment, and that only 
by excluding it from the fiscal deficit rule could public investment be safeguarded. 
 
Little rigorous empirical analysis has, however, sought to test the link between EMU’s fiscal 
rules and public investment. Galí and Perotti (2003) focus on whether or not EMU has 
changed the cyclical behavior of public investment, finding that the ‘mildly pro-cyclical’ 
behaviour of public investment has not been significantly altered by EMU. European 
Commission (2003) and Turrini (2004) assess the role of a range of general economic and 
fiscal variables in determining public investment, finding among other things that EMU has 
had a positive direct impact on the level of public investment, but a negative indirect impact 
through a reduction in fiscal deficits and public debt. 
 
To assess the impact of EMU’s fiscal rules on public investment head on, Mehrotra and 
Välilä (2006) estimate panel data and cointegration models for old EU member states for the 
period 1970-2003. In the panel data analyses the gross fixed capital formation of the general 
government is regressed on various measures of real output; real long-term interest rates; 
public debt; net lending (overall surplus) of the general government; and on a dummy 
variable to account for the participation of the respective economy in EMU. The 
                                                       
7 This section draws on Perée and Välilä (2005) and Mehrotra and Välilä (2006).   10
cointegration analysis, in turn, seeks to disentangle common stochastic trends among public 
investment, budgetary position, and public debt. 
 
In the panel data analyses Mehrotra and Välilä (2006) find that output is a statistically 
significant explanatory variable, obtaining a positive coefficient. The estimated coefficients 
for the aggregated fiscal variables suggest that public investment tends to move in tandem 
with discretionary changes in fiscal policy, but to smooth out movements in public debt. The 
coefficient for the (cyclically adjusted) net lending variable is significant and negative, so 
active fiscal consolidation efforts appear to have hit public investment, while public 
investment has increased during episodes of discretionary fiscal expansion. The debt variable 
is always significant and negative, implying that public investment acts so as to smooth out 
movements in public debt. The real long-term interest rate obtains a positive but only weakly 
significant coefficient, suggesting that financing cost considerations have not played an 
economically sensible role in determining public investment decisions.  
 
Notably, the EMU dummy (defined as a post-Maastricht dummy variable) is never 
individually significant. The same is true for the interaction terms between the EMU dummy 
and the net lending variable, and the dummy and the public debt variable. These results 
suggest that EMU, per se, has had no statistically significant impact on public investment 
either directly or indirectly through its fiscal rules.  
 
In sum, the statistically significant determinants of public investment include the level of 
national income, the budgetary situation, and fiscal sustainability considerations. Neither 
financing costs nor EMU have played a statistically significant role. As confirmed by the 
cointegration analysis, the significant downtrend that characterizes the evolution of public 
investment in non-cohesion countries is chiefly determined by drawn-out episodes of fiscal 
consolidation, unrelated to EMU. 
 
These findings appear consistent with the fact that fiscal consolidation efforts were initiated 
in many countries long before the Maastricht Treaty entered into force, in response to 
structural fiscal problems long in the making. This point is illustrated in Figure 4 that depicts 
the evolution of ’government net worth’ between 1981 and 2001, where net worth is 
measured by the difference between the size of public capital stocks and the amount of public   11
debt in old EU member states.
8 
9A quarter century ago public debt was still more than fully 
backed by public capital in most of the countries. However, at the outset of the new 
millennium, that was no longer the case. Government net worth has contracted in all 
countries between 1981 and 2001 (on average by 30 percent of GDP). In nearly all countries 
net worth had turned negative by 2001.  
 
In other words, most old EU member states have experienced deterioration in their net worth 
that has been both dramatic and taken place over a long time.  The fiscal consolidation efforts 
that have sought to address that deterioration have been equally protracted. The long-term 
trend decline in public investment, which started already in the 1970s in many countries, has 
been one element in such consolidation efforts. EMU’s fiscal rules, while also aimed to 
safeguard fiscal stability and sustainability, have not changed the consolidation and 
adjustment paths significantly one way or the other. 
 









AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IR IT NL PT SP SW UK
1981 2001
 
Sources: Kamps (2006), OECD. 
                                                       
8 Figure 4 is subject to three caveats. First, the ratio of public capital to GDP is expressed in real terms, so it is 
fully comparable with the debt-to-GDP ratio only under the assumption that the GDP deflator can also be used 
to deflate public investment. Second, public debt is measured in terms of gross outstanding debt, thus excluding 
any contingent liabilities, etc. Finally, the comparison above is purely mechanical and does not take into 
account how productive public capital is, i.e., what  the true value is of governments’ fixed assets. 
9 Although Figure 4 only shows observations from two years, they are representative of longer-term patterns. 
See Mehrotra and Välilä (2006.).   12
 
3.2 Have innovative financing mechanisms for infrastructure rendered public 
investment less important? 
 
Section 2 above suggested that public investment has undergone a structural change in the 
old member states, where the downtrend in the ratio of public investment to GDP has either 
slowed or brought the growth of public capital stocks to a halt. Another structural change—at 
least qualitatively speaking—in the financing of infrastructure and public services is the 
emergence of private finance through public-private partnerships (PPPs). The aim of this 
section is to examine their quantitative significance and to thereby assess to what extent they 
may or may not have offset the decline in public investment. 
 
Before embarking on the analysis, a caveat concerning data is required. PPPs are a relatively 
recent phenomenon, and only in the UK have they existed for more than a decade and a half. 
This relative novelty is reflected in the data available on PPPs. Until early 2004, there were 
no European-wide guidelines regarding the treatment of PPPs in national accounts statistics. 
Consequently, countries have treated them in various ways, and apart from the UK where 
data on flow investment through PPPs are available, it has been difficult to assess their 
macroeconomic impact.  
 
To get around this problem, the analysis below is based on micro-level data on individual 
projects structured as PPPs.
10 This approach allows us to get an aggregate picture of the 
extent of PPPs, even in the absence of macro-level data. However, the project-level data 
generally indicate only the total value of each project (a stock variable), but give no 
indication of the annual investment flows envisaged during the construction phase of the 
project.
11 This makes it difficult to assess exactly how much a particular project has 
contributed to aggregate investment, demand, and growth each year. One way to alleviate 
this problem is to compare average PPP transaction values to public investment flows during 
multi-year periods, as is done in Figure 5.    
 
                                                       
10 Further details pertaining to the database used can be found in a forthcoming Economic and Financial Report 
of the Economic and Financial Studies Division, European Investment Bank, EFR/2007-02, available at 
www.eib.org/efs .   13
With these caveats in mind, let us turn to the assessment of the quantitative significance of 
PPPs. Figure 5 shows the average annual value of signed PPP contracts (a stock variable) and 
public investment (a flow variable), both relative to GDP, in those old EU member countries 
that have made most use of PPP procurement. The sample period is split into two, covering 
1995-2000 and 2001-06 respectively, so as to help detect changes over time. 
 
Figure 5. Signed value of PPP contracts (stock) and public investment (flow), (in 












































FR GE GR IR IT NL PT SP UK
PPP (signed value; stock)
Public investment (flow)
 
Sources: Eurostat; ProjectWare; HM Treasury; EirePPP; Infrastructure Journal; 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
 
The only countries where PPPs appear to have some persistent systemic importance are 
Portugal and the UK. In both countries the average signed value of PPP projects (total project 
value) amounts to 20-33 percent of average annual public investment flow. The UK alone 
accounts for more than half of the signed value of all PPP contracts within the EU. In the 
UK, where data on actual investment flows through PPP projects are available through HM 
Treasury, investment through PPPs has equalled 15—25 percent of total public investment in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
11 In other words, the data report only the financial commitment at project signature, which may differ 
significantly from actual investment flows that materialize over the life cycle of the project. This being the case, 
the analysis should be interpreted as telling us something about the upper bound of the size of PPPs.   14
the past years.
12 While investment through PPPs is thus of macroeconomic significance in 
the UK, such investment has not been so significant as to reverse the long-term downtrend in 
public investment, as illustrated in Figure 6.
 13 
 












Sources: OECD, HM Treasury. 
 
In all other countries even the stock value of signed public-private partnership contracts is 
small compared to annual public investment flows. While PPPs seem significant in Greece, 
especially before the change of millennium, their macroeconomic and systemic significance 
has been limited by the small number of large-size individual projects. In contrast, countries 
such as Italy and Spain have had a relatively large number of PPP projects, but these have 
tended to be of small size, thus remaining of limited macroeconomic significance. Obviously, 
as a PPP framework has been developed only in recent years in several countries, the share of 
PPPs relative to public investment, as depicted in Figure 5, could well underestimate the 
long-run share of PPPs moving forward. 
 
                                                       
12 The difference between the actual investment flow figure of 15-25 percent and the relationship between 
signed PPP values and public investment flows of 25-33 percent shown in Figure 5 can be taken as a measure of 
how much upward bias is left in the stock-flow comparison even after considering 5-year averages.   
13 In fact, Figure 6 exaggerates the impact of PPPs, as it double-counts capital expenditure through those PPPs 
that are booked on the public sector’s balance sheet.    15
To sum up the findings about PPPs in financing infrastructure and public services, we have 
seen above that they have had persistent systemic significance from a quantitative 
perspective in just a few countries, notably Portugal and the UK. While qualitatively 
important innovations, PPPs have nevertheless not been significant enough to offset long-
term trends in public investment.  
 
4.   Composition of public investment 
 
The discussion has thus far focussed on aggregate public investment, as has virtually all 
public investment–related research in the European context. We know, however, that public 
sector investment projects cover a wide variety of undertakings, ranging from national 
highway networks to municipal recreation facilities. The economic role and impact of 
transportation networks is very different from swimming pools, to take but one example, so it 
would seem important to dig deeper and consider what aggregate public investment actually 
comprises. 
 
To that end, Eurostat’s New Cronos database reports a breakdown of public investment 
(gross capital formation, including inventories) according to the functional classification of 
the United Nations’ System of National Accounts, also used in the 1995 version of European 
System of Accounts. That breakdown contains ten different classes of public investment, 
which we have re-grouped into four classes on the basis of their different economic 
characteristics. The four classes include: 
 
•  ’Traditional infrastructure,’ most notably communications networks in both 
transportation and telecommunications;
14 
•  ’Human capital infrastructure,’ including investment in schools (education) and 
hospitals (health);  
•  ’Public goods,’ including functions like defence, order and safety, public 
administration, and environment; 
                                                       
14 ’Traditional infrastructure’ consists of ’economic affairs’ in the more detailed breakdown which, in turn, 
includes functions like agriculture, mining, R&D, and others, alongside communications infrastructure. Those 
additional functions add undesirable ’noise’ to what we label traditional infrastructure. While we cannot do 
better in the absence of a further breakdown, there are good reasons to believe that the size of public investment 
in transportation infrastructure dominates the other types of investment.       16
•  ’Redistribution,’ including social housing and protection, as well as recreational 
facilities. 
Using this classification, Figure 7 shows the composition of public investment in the old EU 
member states (EU-15) as a group and separately for the cohesion countries, as well as for 
EU-8 (labelled NMS in the figure).   
 
Two observations stand out from Figure 7. First, the share of infrastructure investment, 
including both traditional and human capital infrastructure investment, is on average about 
one-half of aggregate public investment in EU-15 and in EU-8, with a slightly higher share in 
the cohesion countries. This is striking, especially considering that ’public investment’ and 
’infrastructure investment’ are often used synonymously in both theoretical and empirical 
literature. However, only half of public investment is directly economically productive in the 
sense implied by the literature, which has obvious implications for, e.g., empirical 
assessments of the direct growth impact of public investment and public capital.  
 
The second, and related, observation from Figure 7 is that infrastructure investment, 
especially in traditional transport and other communications infrastructure, is in EU-8 
somewhat higher than in old EU member states, but below the level in the cohesion 
countries. This links to the discussion at the end of Section 2, where it was pointed out that 
for the value of public capital stocks to converge between the new and old EU member 
states, the former would need significantly higher investment in flow terms than the latter. 
While it would be hazardous to draw far-reaching conclusions based on the composition of 
recent investment flows alone, one can nevertheless take Figure 7 to imply that the speed of 
convergence of economically productive public capital stocks between old and new member 
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Figure 7. Composition of public investment in groups of EU countries (in percent of 
















Source: Eurostat, own classification. 
 
There are, again, big differences in the composition of public investment between individual 
EU-8 countries, as shown in Figure 8. At one end of the spectrum, the Czech Republic 
invests in public infrastructure even more than the cohesion countries. At the other end of the 
spectrum, Latvia and the Slovak Republic invest in public infrastructure no more or even less 
than old EU member states. On the other hand, a common feature for almost all EU-8 
countries is the significance of investment in public goods, including defence, order and 
safety, public administration, and the environment. Barring the case of   the Czech Republic, 







                                                       
15 In a more detailed breakdown, the shares of defence, order and safety, public administration, and the 
environment in investment in public goods are roughly speaking equal in EU-8 on average. The share of public 
administration is slightly higher that the others, and to the extent that such investment is linked to the 
development of institutions necessary for a well-functioning market economy, such investment enhances long-
term growth potential.      18



















Source: Eurostat, own classification. 
 
As is obvious from the brief discussion above, the study of the composition of public 
investment is only in its infancy. A better and more nuanced understanding of the role and 
economic impact of different types of public investment is of special policy interest for 
countries that face the oftentimes difficult balancing act between short-term fiscal prudence 
and calls for public investment to enhance their long-term growth potential. And that group 
of countries would seem to include all EU member countries, both old and new alike.  
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
The interesting features about the long-term evolution of public investment have been its 
downtrend in old EU member states, bar the cohesion countries, and its volatility in new 
member states. The downtrend in the old member states cannot be traced back to EMU’s 
fiscal rules per se, nor can it be explained by the emergence of innovative financing 
mechanisms for infrastructure, such as public-private partnerships. Rather, it is the result of 
drawn-out episodes of fiscal adjustment and consolidation, necessitated by long periods of 
unsustainable fiscal policies and deterioration of governments’ net worth.    19
 
All this suggests for the new member states that the on-going build-up of their public capital 
stocks, especially infrastructure capital, requires the safeguarding of sufficient fiscal space to 
accommodate adequate public investment. As public-private partnerships can only offer 
limited support quantitatively speaking, public budgets remain the most important source of 
infrastructure finance. At the same time, the experience of old member states suggests that 
EMU’s fiscal rules need not come with any automatic or inevitable suppression of public 
investment. Thus, the key challenge remains how to safeguard the productivity of public 
investment and public expenditure more broadly.  
 
Put differently, safeguarding a sufficient level of public investment in general and 
infrastructure investment in particular is important, but safeguarding the quality of such 
investment is arguably even more important. This involves the complexities of project 
appraisal, selection, and management within the public sector. But that is another subject 
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